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Abstract: Social Security and Medicare are federal entitlement programs that rep-
resent the current of modern liberalism in the United States. The countercurrent of 
conservatism has been represented by some Republican politicians who have tried 
to reform these programs. 1964 presidential candidate Barry Goldwater suggested 
making Social Security voluntary. In 2005 President George W. Bush made partial 
privatization of Social Security a key component of his second-term domestic agen-
da. From 2010 to 2012 Congressman Paul Ryan advocated a reform of Medicare in 
which the federal government would give seniors vouchers to buy private insurance. 
Each of these proposals backfired. When conservative Republicans propose detailed 
alterations to the pillars of some of the Democratic Party’s main legislative accom-
plishments in the 20th century, they disaffect moderates and independent voters, and 
they fuel the liberal base of the Democratic Party. The proposals are a liability for 
Republicans in national elections because Americans fear that entitlement reform will 
jeopardize the benefits they receive.  
Keywords: Social Security reform, Medicare reform, Barry Goldwater, George W. 
Bush, Paul Ryan
Introduction
Social Security and Medicare are two of the most widely respected federal 
programs in the United States. These programs symbolize the rise of the 
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welfare state and epitomize the legislative accomplishments of liberals in 
the Democratic Party during the 20th century; they are key components of 
the current of modern liberalism in American politics, developed by Wood-
row Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt and advanced further by Lyndon B. 
Johnson and Barack Obama. This is a current of reform that is characterized 
by several laws of the last hundred years that have sought to reduce poverty 
and make American society more just. Among these laws are the federal 
income tax (the 13th Amendment) during the Progressive Era, collective 
bargaining rights for Labor during the New Deal, Head Start and Commu-
nity Action Programs during the time of Johnson’s Great Society, and the 
Affordable Care Act during the Obama presidency.1 
Many senior citizens are highly dependent on Social Security and Medi-
care. For more than one third of retirees, Social Security benefits are at least 
90 percent of their income, according to the Social Security Administration 
(Edsall, “Obamacare”). The retirement of the baby boomers pose consider-
able financial challenges for these programs because young workers must 
support an increasing number of retirees. Firstly, according to a 2013 report 
by the Social Security Board of Trustees, the combined trust funds of Social 
Security will be exhausted by 2033 if no policy changes take place, and 
the program would be able to pay three-fourths of the scheduled benefits 
(Ruffing). Secondly, Medicare’s Hospital Insurance will only remain sol-
vent until 2030. Yet the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities points out 
that President Obama’s Affordable Care Act has “along with other factors, 
significantly improved Medicare’s financial outlook” (Van de Water). 
Politicians of both parties and conservative Republicans in particu-
lar have remained worried about the sustainability of Social Security and 
Medicare, and there have been repeated, unsuccessful attempts by con-
servative Republicans at reforming these programs. These conservatives 
arguably represent the main countercurrent in American political history. 
This countercurrent dominated American politics during the Gilded Age 
of the late 1800s. This was a time of unfettered capitalism and a high level 
of inequality. The countercurrent of conservatism later opposed new laws 
during the New Deal and Great Society. It succeeded in preventing the en-
actment of President Bill Clinton’s health care reform in the 1990s, tried 
1 My argument that liberalism is the current and conservatism is the countercurrent in American political 
history is inspired by my interpretation of the argument the historian Richard Hofstadter makes in The Age 
of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. 
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to repeal the Affordable Care Act, and has proposed changes to Medicaid, 
Medicare, and Social Security. 
Conservative Republicans have repeatedly failed to garner enthusiasm 
for reforms of Social Security and Medicare among moderates and liber-
als in Congress. Firstly, the 1964 Republican presidential candidate Barry 
Goldwater suggested making some payments to Social Security voluntary 
in order to save the system from going bankrupt, which he feared could 
happen (Goldwater, With No Apologies 169). Secondly, in 2005 President 
George W. Bush advocated ideas developed by Congressman Paul Ryan 
and other conservatives to partially privatize Social Security. Political sci-
entist Mitchell A. Orenstein argues that attempts at privatization of pen-
sions is a transnational phenomenon in a time of globalization. Finally, 
Paul Ryan’s recent proposal of premium support, referred to as vouchers, in 
Medicare gained national attention when Republican presidential candidate 
Mitt Romney picked him as his vice-presidential candidate in 2012. All 
these attempts backfired and arguably contributed to making the Republi-
can Party vulnerable in subsequent elections. 
This article argues that even though the federal entitlement programs 
will face challenges in terms of solvency and there appears to be a need for 
reform within the next two decades, conservative Republicans should avoid 
specific proposals of entitlement reform that could jeopardize the sum of 
the benefits that retirees receive. White Americans near or in retirement are 
voters the Republican Party depends on in order to win elections, and plans 
to reform these entitlement programs arguably alienate these voters and 
galvanize the Democratic Party’s liberal base. The author shares the view 
of Nancy J. Altman and Eric R. Kingson who in their 2015 book Social 
Security Works: Why Social Security Isn’t Going Broke And How Expand-
ing It Will Help Us All criticize attempts by conservatives to change this 
important entitlement program. 
A 2011 public opinion poll from NBC News and The Wall Street Journal 
found that large majorities opposed “significantly cutting the funding” for 
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Meanwhile, 62 percent of those 
who responded thought that means-testing Social Security and Medicare 
was either “totally acceptable” or “mostly acceptable.” 37 percent of the 
respondents were in opposition to this (Roy). Similarly, in a 2013 Kaiser 
Family Foundation/Robert Wood Johnson Foundation/Harvard School of 
Public Health survey, 58 percent of respondents did not support any cuts in 
Medicare and Social Security benefits in order to reduce the deficit (Carey).
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Opposing collectivism
Why do some conservatives want to reform Medicare and Social Security 
when these programs are so popular among voters? A main reason for op-
position to the nature of the federal programs of Social Security and Medi-
care is rejection of the idea of collectivism. This rejection is an essential 
component of the ideology of the libertarian strand of conservatism. Liber-
tarianism has often been associated with, among others, Austrian economist 
Friedrich von Hayek and the Russian-American author Ayn Rand. Hayek’s 
1944 book The Road to Serfdom became highly influential due to its criti-
cism of planned economies. Rand’s novels The Fountainhead (1943) and 
Atlas Shrugged (1957) inspired many politicians and have had a renais-
sance with the rise of the Tea Party Movement during the first presidential 
term of Barack Obama.2 
Opposition to collectivism has deep historical roots. In The Man Versus the 
State (1884), the English philosopher Herbert Spencer developed a theory of 
social Darwinism and coined the term “the survival of the fittest” (Heywood 
18). This idea was dominant during the Victorian Era in Britain and the Gild-
ed Age in the United States in the late 1800s when opposition to government 
intervention in economic activities was strong. William Graham Sumner is 
another scholar whose views epitomized the social Darwinism of the Gilded 
Age. He was a sociologist at Yale University and an influential intellectual in 
the late 19th century. In 1883 he published the essay “What Social Classes 
Owe To Each Other” in which he argued that classes did not owe each other 
much. He opposed government aid to the poor, claiming that “[i]t was not at 
all the function of the State to make men happy. They must make themselves 
happy in their own way, and at their own risk” (Gage).
The ideas of Spencer and Sumner struck a responsive chord among con-
servatives in the postwar era. Their arguments are echoed in the political 
message of Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) and Congressman Paul 
Ryan (R-Wisconsin). Both Goldwater and Ryan denounced collectivism and 
expressed their ideologies in written documents. Most significantly, Gold-
water outlined his views in his 1960 political manifesto The Conscience of 
a Conservative, whereas Paul Ryan has presented his views in Republican 
budget proposals in the House of Representatives that have been referred 
2 For an analysis of Ayn Rand’s influence on the contemporary Republican Party see Gary Weiss, Ayn Rand 
Nation: The Hidden Struggle for America’s Soul (2012). See also Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, 
The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism (2012).
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to as the “Roadmap to America’s Future” and “Path to Prosperity.” The 
similarities between the ideologies of Goldwater and Ryan are particularly 
strong on the issues of personal responsibility and freedom in economic 
policies. In Conscience of a Conservative Goldwater claims that “if we take 
from a man the personal responsibility for caring for his material needs, 
we take from him also the will and the opportunity to be free” (Goldwater, 
Conscience 77). Similarly, in the 2010 “Roadmap for America’s Future,” 
Ryan writes that: “[o]nly by taking responsibility for oneself, to the greatest 
extent possible, can one ever be free.” And “only a free person can make 
responsible choices – between right and wrong, saving and spending, giv-
ing or taking” (Ryan qtd. in Lizza).
The suggestions for entitlement program changes by both Goldwater and 
Ryan were initially rejected by the leadership of the Republican Party. Es-
tablishment politicians were afraid of alienating important groups of voters 
and knew that these programs were particularly popular among the elderly. 
However, the ideas of Goldwater and Ryan gained considerable attention 
and legitimacy as the conservative wing of the party became increasingly 
stronger within the Republican Party.
Barry Goldwater’s suggestion on Social Security
Senator Barry Goldwater had a reputation for being an honest politician 
who stated his positions clearly, regardless of the type of audience he ad-
dressed. Elected to the Senate in 1952, he remained a vocal critic of Presi-
dent Dwight Eisenhower’s inability to cut federal spending significantly. 
Some conservatives in the Republican Party wanted Goldwater to run for 
president already in 1960, but the Arizonan was not prepared at that time. 
After he finally decided to do so in 1963, encouraged by the so-called Draft 
Goldwater movement, the senator had hoped to take part in an engaging 
campaign against President John F. Kennedy. He believed that the cam-
paign would focus on ideological differences between the candidates and 
political solutions to problems. Goldwater had great respect for President 
Kennedy and regarded him as a friend. He was troubled by the assassina-
tion of Kennedy and realized that the campaign against Lyndon B. Johnson 
would be very different and less cordial. The Arizona senator despised Lyn-
don B.  Johnson but realized that he would not be able to defeat the Texan, 
because the United States would not be ready for three presidents in a little 
over a year (Goldwater, With No Apologies 161, 164).
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In his 1988 memoir, Goldwater acknowledged having made mistakes 
in the presidential campaign on the issue of Social Security. He pointed 
out that it was a mistake to discuss the financial crunch of Social Security 
in Florida (Goldwater, Goldwater 200). In another state, New Hampshire, 
Goldwater’s views on Social Security were distorted by the media. He 
wanted to make some changes in Social Security, including making some 
contributions voluntary, but he had not developed a proper policy proposal. 
The next day the Concord Monitor had the headline “GOLDWATER SETS 
GOALS: END SOCIAL SECURITY” (Goldwater, Goldwater 203). Gold-
water noted that he had voted to increase Social Security benefits in 1956, 
1958, and 1964. The senator justified his reform plans for Social Security 
by noting that the ratio of workers to retirees had fallen remarkably com-
pared to the situation at the time when the program was established, and 
that members of both parties had suggested that something be done to the 
program (Goldwater, Goldwater 203). 
It is difficult to persuade the public that changes are necessary to pro-
grams they depend on themselves. Thus, Goldwater’s minor suggestions 
for changes to Social Security became campaign meat for the Democrats. 
As the historian Rick Perlstein points out, Social Security was the topic of 
their advertisement that was aired most frequently. In the advertisement, 
two hands tore a Social Security card in two, which was an exaggeration 
of Goldwater’s position on the Democrats’ behalf. According to Perlstein, 
there was “no such ‘voluntary plan’; the subject had barely crossed Gold-
water’s lips since the primary in New Hampshire” (Perlstein 434). By run-
ning such an advertisement, Democrats sought to appeal to the perception 
of their party as the preserver of the safety net and welfare state that Frank-
lin Roosevelt had created. The Republican Party was thus perceived as the 
party of risk and instability on Social Security. The historian Mark Nevin 
argues that “Goldwater’s opposition to Social Security was a major liability 
during the 1964 campaign.” The senator’s “disparaging remarks stuck and 
hurt his chances in the general election” (Nevin).
After Barry Goldwater’s massive electoral defeat in November of 1964, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson enacted major pieces of liberal legislation. 
He built on the work of Franklin D. Roosevelt by implementing Medicare 
and Medicaid. These programs were key aspects of the Great Society, and 
Medicare helped reduce poverty among retirees. As with Social Security, 
Medicare became widely accepted, and the rising popularity of these pro-
grams made them increasingly untouchable for politicians.     
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As an example, like Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan was critical of the 
way Social Security was organized by the federal government. In 1975 when 
the former California governor campaigned to challenge President Gerald 
Ford for the Republican nomination in 1976, Reagan suggested making 
participation in the program voluntary. Reporters Tom Hamburger and Pe-
ter Wallsten argue that “[t]o a significant degree, [Reagan’s] criticism of the 
program cost him the chance to run for president in 1976” (Hamburger and 
Wallsten 196). After becoming president, however, Reagan realized how 
central the program was, and he cooperated with the Democrats and “even 
signed tax increases to make Social Security more secure” (Dionne 238). 
Reagan must have been afraid of disaffecting moderates and independent 
voters who generally support the current Social Security system. The So-
cial Security system remained intact during the 1980s and 1990s, and there 
were no specific efforts to enact reforms.
George W. Bush’s quest for Social Security reform
The reelection of President George W. Bush in 2004 together with Repub-
lican majorities in both chambers of Congress was clearly one of the most 
euphoric moments for the conservative movement. Bush had continued 
the work of Ronald Reagan, cutting taxes significantly in 2001 and 2003. 
Emboldened conservatives believed the election results provided a unique 
opportunity for Social Security reform, and in early 2005 President Bush 
made this the centerpiece of his domestic agenda. He felt he had earned po-
litical capital through his 2004 reelection, and he famously said that he in-
tended to spend this capital. Thus on paper he was in a much better position 
to be able to reform Social Security than Barry Goldwater had been. One 
of Bush’s visions was to create the so-called Ownership Society that would 
empower individuals to make more decisions themselves. Social Security 
reform was a pillar of the Ownership Society, and it was the issue Bush 
prioritized in the early months of 2005. Social scientist Terry Weiner argues 
that based on the history of presidential agenda-setting it was surprising 
that Bush would focus on such a major initiative when the congressional 
majority of his party was so slim (Weiner).
Bush had wanted to advance Social Security reform for a long time. Ac-
cording to William Galston of the Brookings Institution, already in his 1978 
congressional campaign Bush had argued that Social Security could not 
be sustained unless people would be allowed to invest the payroll taxes 
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themselves (Galston). In his campaign for the presidency in 2000, Bush 
had “touted a rough proposal to encourage private investment accounts” 
(Hamburger and Wallsten 187). On January 3, 2005, Peter Wehner, White 
House Director of Strategic Initiatives, wrote in an internal memo that was 
leaked to the press that it was possible to win the Social Security battle for 
the first time in six decades. In doing so, the Bush Administration could 
“help transform the political and philosophical landscape of the country” 
(Hamburger and Wallsten 201). 
In January 2005 Bush traveled extensively to promote his plan for Social 
Security. The plan, he assured, would not affect the benefits of current re-
cipients, and people close to retirement could also depend on the same sys-
tem (Hamburger and Wallsten 194). Republicans were afraid of offending 
seniors, who could turn against them in future elections. After all, Republi-
cans had courted seniors before the reelection by expanding Medicare with 
prescription drug coverage. On Social Security, Bush expressed a certain 
amount of flexibility in order to finance the overhaul. He was open to sug-
gestions of raising the retirement age and limiting benefits for retirees. Bush 
talked at length about Social Security in his 2005 State of the Union Ad-
dress. Assessing the speech, Dan Balz of the Washington Post argued that 
the only option he “explicitly ruled out was raising payroll taxes” (Balz).
Bush had some support for these proposals among conservatives in Con-
gress. Ryan Lizza of the New Yorker has noted that Congressman Paul Ryan 
was among the people who persuaded Bush to prioritize Social Security 
after the 2004 reelection. Ryan had originally advocated that workers invest 
about half their payroll taxes in private accounts. The amount Bush eventu-
ally decided to support was lower than this (Lizza).
Like Paul Ryan, the libertarian Cato Institute has been a key proponent of 
privatization of Social Security. In 1999 Cato issued a report that conclud-
ed, not surprisingly, that private accounts would be more popular among 
people in America who owned stocks than among those who did not. Since 
a majority of Americans owned stock in 2000, advisers of Bush believed 
the time was finally ripe for their reform plans (Hamburger and Wallsten 
197). However, they chose to wait until after the 2004 reelection.    
Liberal Democrats were vocal in their criticism of Bush’s reform sugges-
tions, since it was important for them to be viewed as the protectors of eco-
nomic stability for seniors. Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nevada) 
repudiated Bush’s proposal in his televised response to the president’s State 
of the Union Address. He claimed that “the Bush plan isn’t really Social Se-
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curity reform; it’s more like Social Security roulette. Democrats are all for 
giving Americans more of a say and more choices when it comes to their re-
tirement savings, but that doesn’t mean taking Social Security’s guarantee 
and gambling with it. And that’s coming from a senator who represents Las 
Vegas” (Reid). Other Democrats expressed similar concerns and a number 
of Republicans feared the consequences of the changes, since The transition 
costs to the new system would be high.
During the winter of 2005 there was a massive campaign both for and 
against the proposal. One of the main groups advocating Bush’s plan was 
the Coalition for the Modernization and Protection of America’s Social Se-
curity (COMPASS). This group joined forces with several corporations and 
the Business Roundtable. These organizations repeatedly met with the Re-
publican National Committee. Bush adviser Karl Rove met with lobbyists 
and explained that Social Security was the president’s “top domestic prior-
ity” (Hamburger and Wallsten 201-202, 204).
Conservatives faced strong opposition from left-of-center groups, how-
ever. Among the most active opponents of reform were labor groups such as 
AFL-CIO and senior citizen organizations (Hamburger and Wallsten 201-
202). The effort of these groups possibly affected the views of some busi-
ness associations because doubts began to emerge. Companies were less 
enthusiastic about private accounts than Bush and Rove had envisioned. 
One of the founders of COMPASS, the Financial Services Forum, left the 
organization due to disagreement regarding private accounts (Hamburger 
and Wallsten 205). Moreover, public opinion polls remained against the 
plans of the Bush Administration, and it proved impossible to sway the 
opinions of lawmakers. It did not help that Republicans had a majority in 
both chambers of Congress. When Hurricane Katrina struck, the issue of 
Social Security reform was overshadowed by the media’s portrayal of the 
incompetence of the Bush Administration in responding to a large natural 
disaster.       
In retrospect, President George W. Bush spent his political capital un-
wisely by investing so much energy on an issue that the American people 
did not support. He obviously underestimated the hurdles his plan faced. He 
had been reelected mainly because he had kept the nation safe and had pre-
vented a new 9/11 and because of opposition to gay marriage in key states 
such as Ohio. Still, a majority of voters did not want to alter a key com-
ponent of their safety nets. However, as journalism professor and leading 
political analyst Thomas Edsall has argued, “George W. Bush demonstrated 
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a willingness to absorb a short-term defeat to put [Social Security] squarely 
into the public arena and to show that a Republican president could touch 
the ‘third rail’ of American politics – challenging a mainstay of the New 
Deal and a program of great importance to millions of Americans” (Edsall, 
Building Red America 43).
Bush’s failure to enact Social Security reform was the beginning of the 
downturn of his presidency. Hurricane Katrina and the sectarian warfare 
in Iraq were among the most difficult challenges for the president in the 
first part of his second term. Moreover, as with Social Security, Bush failed 
to achieve immigration reform during his second term. He finally left the 
White House at the peak of the worst financial crisis since the Great De-
pression. 
Paul Ryan’s Medicare reform proposal
Paul Ryan became a congressman after the 1998 elections and became 
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee in 2015.  He is a pro-
tégé of former Congressman Jack Kemp of New York, who was Bob Dole’s 
vice-presidential candidate in 1996 and one of the main advocates of major 
federal income tax cuts and supply-side economics. During his career Paul 
Ryan has been eager to reform Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. 
He advocates decentralization of power from the federal to the state level. 
An example of a successful reform that decentralized power that conserva-
tives often highlight is the 1996 welfare reform where Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children was replaced by Temporary Aid to Needy Families. 
In this program people would receive support for a lifetime maximum of 
five years and be required to enter job programs. President Bill Clinton had 
vetoed two welfare bills that the Republican-controlled Congress had sent 
him, but he ultimately signed a third bill.
Paul Ryan’s plan to restructure Medicare was similar to George W. 
Bush’s Social Security plan in that it would not affect current retirees or 
people close to retirement age. Ryan’s plan would only affect people who 
were 55 years or younger. There would be no changes until 2023. From 
then onwards “the age of eligibility for Medicare would increase by two 
months every year until it reached 67 in 2033” (Wyler). The plan’s key 
component is that beneficiaries would receive voucher payments from the 
federal government in order to purchase private insurance plans. Thus there 
would assumedly be competition among companies that would offer such 
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plans “on a new Medicare Exchange similar to the insurance exchange now 
offered to federal workers, including members of Congress” (Wyler).
As late as 2010, Ryan’s ideas on Medicare had been controversial among 
Republicans in Congress. Having cooperated with fellow Republicans 
Eric Cantor and Kevin McCarthy in the House of Representatives, Paul 
Ryan had articulated his political vision in a manifesto called “Roadmap 
for America’s Future.” According to Ryan Lizza, Speaker John Boehner 
had distanced himself from parts of the “Roadmap” and had insured that 
most Republican congressmen had not embraced Ryan’s plan to change 
Medicare during the campaign for the 2010 elections. Instead Republican 
candidates had criticized President Obama for cutting Medicare spending 
as part of his new health care reform (Lizza).
After the 2010 elections, Ryan exerted a profound influence on the 
“eighty-seven Republican freshmen who wanted to starve the government 
but had no clear idea how to do so” (Lizza). Having listened to colleagues, 
Ryan modified the “Roadmap” and made it slightly less ideological, and 
presented a budget in April 2011 called “A Path to Prosperity.” President 
Obama denounced the proposal, but this had little effect on Republican 
House members. The plan crafted by Ryan passed the House of Representa-
tives by a vote of 235-193. Only four Republicans voted against it (Lizza). 
This vote illustrated the strength of the new Tea Party faction in the House 
and signaled how few Republican moderates remained in Congress and 
how far to the right the Republican Party had moved on issues dealing with 
personal responsibility and the distribution of wealth.
In his 2012 book Ayn Rand Nation: The Hidden Struggle for America’s 
Soul, journalist Gary Weiss argues that there is a strong connection between 
the policy proposals of Paul Ryan and the ideas of the author Ayn Rand. As 
Weiss puts it, “Medicare was on the Rand hit list before the program even 
existed” (Weiss 19). The way Paul Ryan defended his premium support pro-
gram in an opinion piece in the Chicago Tribune in May 2011 was influenced 
by the rhetoric of Ayn Rand. Ryan wrote that the plan would let “seniors 
act as value-conscious consumers in a transparent and competitive market” 
(Ryan, “The Budget”). Weiss argues that Ryan ultimately wanted to abolish 
Medicare (Weiss 19). This claim seems to be an exaggeration, however, es-
pecially in light of Ryan’s 2013 federal budget agreement with Senate Demo-
crat Patty Murray, which left the entitlement programs untouched.
Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson argue that Paul Ryan’s proposal 
was based on goals of billionaires David and Charles Koch, but not of the 
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grassroots of the Tea Party. They claim that “[t]here is no evidence that or-
dinary American citizens who sympathize with the Tea Party were clamor-
ing for the elimination of Medicare in early 2011” (Skocpol and Williamson 
176). The organization Americans for Prosperity, which is supported by the 
Koch brothers, actively persuaded new Republican congressmen to back 
the proposal.
The Obama Administration began to criticize Paul Ryan’s Medicare re-
form plan as soon as it became publicly known in 2010. On the White 
House blog Obama adviser Stephanie Cutter argued that “[u]nder the Ryan 
plan, the Medicare seniors know and trust would disappear” (Cutter). She 
referred to an argument by Director of the Office of Management and Bud-
get Peter Orzag that the voucher would not increase to the same extent as 
the costs of health care, and that this would affect seniors negatively finan-
cially (Cutter). President Obama personally attacked the Medicare propos-
als during the years of 2011 and 2012.
When Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney picked Paul Ryan 
as his running mate in the summer of 2012, conservatives were pleased and 
believed this choice would energize the base of the party and attract funding. 
The selection of the visionary Wisconsinite symbolized the strength of the 
conservative wing of the party, and attention turned towards Ryan’s Medi-
care proposal. However, Medicare reform did not become a central topic 
for the Romney-Ryan campaign. Romney knew well that Ryan had been 
criticized during public meetings in 2011, and he wanted to avoid alienating 
senior voters and others who were critical of reform. Instead Ryan assert-
ed in his convention speech that Obama took $716 billion from Medicare 
to help finance the Affordable Care Act, often referred to as Obamacare. 
He proclaimed that the “greatest threat to Medicare is Obamacare” (Ryan, 
“Address”). As Ryan had initially supported Obama’s savings on Medicare 
himself, it is ironic that he accused the president of weakening this entitle-
ment program.
The defeat of the Republican presidential ticket in 2012 undermined any 
immediate chance of a Medicare overhaul. Moreover, the fact that the 2013 
budget agreement between the Democrats and Republicans did not include 
entitlement reform seems to signal that this issue will be postponed until af-
ter the Obama presidency ends in 2017. Liberal Democrats are as skeptical 
of compromise on entitlement programs as conservative Republicans are of 
taxes, and this skepticism makes a so-called grand bargain highly unlikely. 
If the Republicans capture the presidency in 2016 and secure a majority 
59goldwater, bush, ryan and the failed attempts
in both chambers of Congress, it is likely that the party will try to reform 
either Social Security or Medicare or both programs.        
Explanations of entitlement reform failures
The successive failure by conservative Republicans to reform entitlement 
programs may be a sign that Americans are less conservative on economic 
issues than the general skepticism of government power would imply. Polls 
often show that a plurality of Americans claim that they are conservative 
and want to reduce the size and scope of the federal government, but they 
are critical of reforms of the pillars of the New Deal and Great Society. This 
ambivalence about the role of government is pointed out by Emory Univer-
sity political scientist Alan Abramowitz in his commentary “The Myth of a 
Conservative Public.” He refers to the groundbreaking work of Lloyd Free 
and Hadley Cantril in their 1967 book The Political Beliefs of Americans. 
They found that “Americans tend to be ideologically conservative and op-
erationally liberal” (Abramowitz). Abramowitz refers to a Gallup poll from 
September 2010 that revealed similar patterns as those Free and Cantril had 
detected more than forty years earlier. Americans adhere to conservative 
principles in the abstract, but support Medicare and other specific federal 
programs that address societal problems (Abramowitz). 
Social Security and Medicare are more broadly supported than the Af-
fordable Care Act. However, attitudes to the so-called Obamacare reveal 
the pattern that Republicans need to keep the debate at an abstract level. 
There is more disapproval of the act per se than the individual components 
of the law, such as the illegality of preventing people with preexisting con-
ditions from obtaining health insurance and the opportunity to let young 
adults stay on their parents’ health plan until they are 26 years old.
There are obvious parallels between President Bush’s drive for Social 
Security reform in 2005 and Paul Ryan’s advocacy of Medicare reform in 
2011. Right after a solid electoral victory the party in control may overreach 
when trying to achieve significant change. The federal tax cuts enacted un-
der Republican presidents in 1981 and 2001 are examples of such change. 
However, it is different with entitlement programs. Even though Ryan re-
peatedly underscored that everyone above 55 would not be affected by the 
proposed changes, people were skeptical of his proposal because they were 
afraid of losing benefits. A few years after the worst financial crisis since 
the 1930s and with falling stock prices it is easy to understand people’s fear 
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of risk. Perhaps Ryan should have learned from Bush’s failure in 2005 and 
downplayed the proposal. 
Conclusion
Conservative Republicans play to the Democratic Party’s strength when 
they suggest specific changes to federal entitlement programs. When con-
servatives propose detailed alterations to the pillars of some of the Demo-
cratic Party’s main legislative accomplishments in the 20th century, Social 
Security and Medicare, they run the risk of alienating moderates and in-
dependent voters, while at the same time fueling the liberal base of the 
Democratic Party. Thus Barry Goldwater’s suggestion on Social Security 
was attacked by the media, and he failed to connect with voters on this is-
sue. Similarly, George W. Bush and Paul Ryan struggled to convince both 
Congress and the American people about the necessity of their own propos-
als on Social Security and Medicare. Entitlement programs are so strongly 
tied to the successes of the liberals within the Democratic Party in creating 
a modern welfare state that reform proposals tend to constitute a liability for 
Republicans in national elections. These reform proposals can be regarded 
as counter-reforms since they are based on the ideology of the countercur-
rent of conservatism, which emphasizes self-reliance above government 
responsibility for preserving a safety net.
Ironically, one might argue that conservative Republicans deserve credit 
for advancing proposals that could possibly save the programs of Social 
Security and Medicare and make them financially sound in a long-term per-
spective, even though Democrats easily dismiss these proposals as attacks 
against the safety net by the “party of the rich.” Given that the financial 
crisis of 2008 added to the fear of volatile private accounts, issues such as 
law and order and national security are safer to focus on for the Republican 
Party than entitlement reform. Yet the rising national debt and the projected 
exhaustion of the Social Security trust funds will probably make entitle-
ment reform necessary in the future, and ideas by conservatives may then 
receive more support from voters.  
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